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Hitherto there has been a tendency in this country-at
least with respect to isthmian affairs-to make questions of
national restraint and obligation secondary to questions of
national policy. The prosecution of a plan supposedly advan-
tageous to the United States has been the first consideration;
the justification of such a plan according to the law of nations
has been a matter of minor importance. The politician who,
for example, has advocated exclusive American control of an
isthmian canal, who has urged legislation to that end, and has
scornfully referred to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as a lapsed
and worn-out compact has been surer of the approval of his
constituents than he who has ventured to question not only
the wisdom of American control of the waterway, but also the
very right of our government to disregard the terms of an
agreement with a friendly power.
In contrast to such a tendency was the attitude of the Sec-
retary of State in submitting to the British ,Ambassador the
isthmian canal treaty which was signed February 5, 1900.
Two vital conditions confronted Mr. Hay, and he appreciated
the significance of both. On the one hand there was a wide-
spread desire throughout this country for the immediate con-
struction of an inter-oceanic waterway under the auspices of
the United States. This desire was intensified bythe reluctance
of private capital to embark on the enterprise under existing
circumstances. On the other hand, the terms of the Clayton-
Bulwer treaty were a frank reminder of prohibitions expressly
forbidding our government from building or obtaining any ex-
clusive control over an isthmian canal, and from occupying,
fortifying, tolonizing or exercising any dominion over any part
of Central America. The Secretary of State endeavored, there-
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fore, to prepare a treaty which should enable the United States
to construct the waterway under its own auspices, and at the
same time remove the objections presented by the Clayton-Bul
wer treaty. He foresaw that a convention embodying a plan
of neutralization would satisfy Great Britain and at the same
time not impair existing rights of the United States. He also
firmly believed that the neutralization of the canal would be
equally advantageous to our own country.
The Hay-Pauncefote treaty frankly expressed the purposes
of the negotiator. In the preamble it was stated that the two
nations were desirous to facilitate the construction of a ship
canal to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and to that
end to remove any objection which may arise out of the con-
vention of April 18, 1850, commonly called the Clayton-Bul-
wer treaty, to the construction of such canal under the aus-
pices of the government of the United States without impair-
ing the general principle of neutralization established in Article
VIII of that convention."
The same purpose was reiterated in Article II:
"The high contracting parties desiring to preserve and
maintain the general principle of neutralization established in
Article VIII of the Clayton-Bulwer convention, adopt as the
basis of such neutralization the following rules:"
The Senate in modifying the Hay-Pauncefote treaty left
unchanged these candid expressions. By ratifying the treaty
though otherwise amended, that body apparently indicated
its approyal of the neutralized status of an isthmian canal,
and at the same time admitted that the Clayton-Buwer treaty
opposed to American control of an inter-oceanic waterway a
barrier which necessitated for its removal, the consent of
Great Britain.
The treaty as it was originally submitted to the Senate con-
tained exact provisions to express the purpose "declared in the
preamble and in Article II. By the terms of the first article,
our government secured the right to construct the waterway
as it might see fit. It was permitted to do so directly at its
own cost, or indirectly through individual or corporate
agencies, the United States in either event retaining all rights
incident to the construction and management of the canal.
A plan of neutralization was adopted following the con-
vention of October 29, 1888, providing for the neutraliza-
tion of the Suez canal.
The second and third articles provided that the canal
should be free in time of war as in time of peace to the vessels of
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commerce and of war of all nations without discrimination of
any sort. The canal was never to be blockaded, nor was any
right of war to be exercised, nor act of hostility to be com-
mitted within it. It was agreed that naval vessels of a bellig-
erent should not re-victual in the canal, except so far as might
be strictly necessary; and the transit of such vessels through
the canal was to be effected with the least possible delay. Bel-
ligerents were not to be allowed to embark or disembark
troops or munitions of war in the waterway, except in case of
accidental hindrance in transit. The adjacent waters within
three miles of either terminus were included in the -provisions
for neutralization; and the time was limited during which the
war ships of a belligerent might linger within such waters.
It was agreed that the plant and all works incidental to the
construction of the canal should be considered a part of the
canal and should enjoy complete immunity from attack or
injury by belligerents. Fortifications commanding the
canal or adjacent waters were prohibited. The United
States was, however, to be at liberty to maintain a
military police force along the canal, to protect it
against lawlessness and disorder. It was further agreed
that the two contracting parties, upon the exchange of
ratifications should immediately bring the convention to the
notice of the other powers, and invite them to adhere to it.
To render the waterway permanently safe from attack,
and forever isolated from scenes of warlike activity, required
the acquiescence of the other powers. Complete immunity
from injury could only be guaranteed by international consent.
The probability of the adherence of the other powers was
known. Thus the actual and technical neutralization of the
projected canal was to be reasonably anticipated as the result
of the ratification of the compact by the United States.
The first amendment of the Hay-Pauncefote convention
was the insertion of the words "which is superseded," follow-
ing the reference to the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in Article II.
The insertion did not signify that the Senate undertook to
abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer treaty without the consent of
England. The use of such language in a treaty submitted to
Great Britain for acceptance would imply an opposite inten-
tion. As a declaration of the scope and effect of either the Hay-
Pauncefote convention or of the treaty finally amended with
reference to the compact of 1850, the words used are not out
of place. By the provisions of both instruments, the Clayton-
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Bulwer treaty is in point of fact superseded. The provisions
which England might seek to enforce by virtue of the compact
of t850 are either set aside or re-asserted.
The second amendment was inserted after certain sections
of Article II, providing for the neutralization of the canal, and
immediately preceding the section prohibiting fortifications
commanding the canal or adjacent waters. It was in the fol-
lowing words :
"It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately fore-
going conditions and stipulations in sections numbered 1, 2, 3,
4 and 5 of this article shall apply to the measures which the
United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its
own forces the defence of the United States and the mainte-
nance of public order."
By this means, provision was made for a contingency when
the canal might become the center of hostilities. It was to be
left to the United States to determine the circumstances in
which it should exercise rights of war in the vicinity of the
canal, as well as the character of naval and military operations
necessary for the national defence. By this amendment, our
country was to enjoy the right, when necessity so required, to
do the very things which Mr. Hay and Lord Pauncefote agreed
that neither nation should do, and to act in direct violation of
the general principles which the Senate expressed its desire to
preserve and maintain. In the recent note of His Majesty's
government to Lord Pauncefote formally rejecting the amend-
ed treaty, Lord Lansdowne criticises in detail the changes
made by the Senate. Referring to the insertion above noted,
he says:
"The first of them which reserves to the United States the
right of taking any measures which they may find necessary to
secure by their own forces the defence of the United States,
appears to His Majesty's government to involve a distinct
departure from the principle which until now found acceptance
with both governments,-the principle, namely, that in time of
war as wellas in time of peace the passage of the canal is to
remain free and unimpeded and is to be so maintained by the
power or powers responsible for its control. Were this amend-
ment to be added to the convention, the United States would,
it is presumed, be within their rights, if at any moment when
it seemed to them that their safetyrequired it, in view of war-
like preparations not yet commenced, but contemplated or
supposed to be contemplated by another power, they resorted
to warlike acts in or near the canal-acts clearly inconsistent
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with the neutral character which it has always been sought togive it, and which would deny the free use of it to the com-
merce and navies of the world." I
The fact that the amendment by its terms had reference
solely to the preceding sections, and that it was followed by a
section prohibiting the fortification of the canal was unsatis-
factory to the British government. Lord Lansdowne in this
connection says :
"BEven if it were more precisely worded it would be impos-
sible to determine what might be the effect if one clause permit-
ting defensive measures and another forbidding fortifications
were allowed to stand side by side in the convention."
The third and last amendment consisted in striking out the
provision inviting the adherence of other powers. The situa-
tion would not have been altogether devoid of humor had the
Senate in view of its previous amendment seen fit to invite the
other maritime nations to accede to an agreement by the
terms of which they should at all times refrain from exercising
acts of war within the waters of the canal, and at the same
time permit the United States under a certain contingency to
be free from such restraint and make use of the waterway
as a strategic base. More surprising is the invitation seriously
proffered to Bngland to agree to impose upon itself an obliga-
tion not imposed upon any other power, nor even upon the
United States. Lord Lansdowne's criticism of this amendment
expresses well the discrimination against his government:
"The amendment not only removes all prospect of the
wider guaranty of tle neutrality of the canal, but places this
country in a position of marked disadvantage compared with
other powers which would not be subject to the self-denying
ordinance which Great Britain is desired to accept. It would
follow, were His Majesty's government to agree to such anarrangement, that while the United States would have a treaty
right to interfere with the canal in time of war or apprehended
war, and while other powers could with a clear conscience dis-regard any of the restrictions imposed by the convention,
Great Britain alone in spite of her enormous possessions onthe American continent, in spite of the extent of her Austral-
asian colonies and her interests in the East, would be absolute-
ly precluded from resorting to any such action or from taking
measures to secure her interests in and near the canal."
I The several extracts from Lrd Lansdowne's note are taken from press
despatches of earch 25, 1901.
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It is difficult to answer the British objections. That His
Majesty's government would decline to accept the amended
treaty was to be anticipated. Willingness on the part of Great
Britain to become a party to a convention providing for the
neutralization of the waterway, and contemplating the ad-
herence of the other powers, did not signify a willingness also
to acquiesce in a plan arranging for exclusive American control
of the canal in the event of a certain contingency. If the Senate
believed that American control was essential to the best'in-
terests of the United States, and that a treaty to that end
should be submitted to the British government, it is unfortu-
nate that such a plan was not frankly presented in its true
colors rather than under cover of declarations alleging a desire
on the part of the United States to preserve and maintain the
general principle of neutralization. But the isthmian canal ne-
gotiations have not been barren of good results. The attitude
of Great Britain has been ascertained. That government has
expressed its approval of a plan permitting the United States
to construct the canal under its own auspices as well as to
manage and regulate it, provided the waterway be given a
neutralized status. The United States, on the contrary, has
indicated a desire to secure for itself the right, at certain times
to regard the waterway as a part of its own coast line.
This country has at the same time declared to England
through the Department of State, and by the action of the
Senate that it still recognizes the binding character of the Clay-
ton-Bulwer treaty. This has been a direct result of the
isthmian canal negotiations. A clearer understanding of our
duty to England according to the agreement of 1850 has
aroused a greater reluctance to disregard the restraints and
obligations then imposed. With the growth of the desire for
American control there has developed a sense of the impro-
priety of any effort on the part of the United States to secure
such control without the consent of England. A national con-
sciousness that Great Britain has a right to withhold its con-
sent has been stimulated. This fact minimizes the isthmian
canal prob]em. It removes all objection to the giving of a con-
sideration for the acquisition of greater rights in the isthmus.
What Great Britain would require as compensation for the re-
linquishment of its hold upon the United States with respect to
an inter-oceanic canal is still a matter of conjecture. Never-
theless the appreciation of the fact that the difiuculties between
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the two nations are reduced to a question of the adjustment
of consideration promises such. The solution of the problem
has been hastened by the negotiations of the Hay-Paunce-
fote treaty, by its amendment by the Senate and by its final
rejection by His Majesty's government.
